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Daubert, Doctors and Differential Diagnosis:
Treating Medical Causation Testimony as Evidence
An assessment of admissibility is not the same as an assessment
of sufficiency, but Daubert has created that confusion
By Michael B. Kent Jr.
CAROL HELLER began experiencing
various respiratory problems shortly after
Shaw Industries installed new carpeting in
her house.' A few months later, she con-
sulted an allergist, Dr. Joseph Papano. He
took her medical and family histories,
questioned her about the house's environ-
ment, ordered chest x-rays, and performed
several laboratory tests. Based on his find-
ings from the collected data, Dr. Papano
ruled out various possible causes of
Heller's respiratory problems. This win-
nowing process, known as "differential di-
agnosis" in the medical community,
coupled with the close temporal relation-
ship between Heller's symptoms and the
installation of the new carpet, led Dr.
Papano to conclude that the carpet was the
cause of her illness.
Heller sued Shaw Industries for, among
other things, failure to warn and defective
design. She called Dr. Papano as an expert
witness to testify on the issue of causa-
tion, but the trial court excluded his testi-
mony. The problem: Although Dr. Papano
conducted a differential diagnosis to deter-
mine what did not cause Heller's symp-
toms, he could point to no studies indicat-
ing that the carpet could cause them.
Without this testimony, Heller could not
prove causation, and the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Shaw.
1. Heller v. Shaw Indus. Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d
Cir. 1999).
2. Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs. Inc., 874
F.Supp. 1441, 1448 (D. V.I. 1994). See also Ster-
ling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th
Cir. 1988) (discussing general and specific causa-
tion in mass tort class action litigation).
Michael B. Kent Jr. is a 1999 graduate
of the University of Georgia Law School,
having obtained his B.A. degree from the
University of Alabama in 1995. Since
writing this article, he has taken a posi-
tion as law clerk for Judge J. Owen
Forrester of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia.
This is an edited and condensed
version of the paper with which he won
second place in the 1999 IADC Legal
Writing Contest.
The Third Circuit, while disagreeing with
some of the trial court's rationale, affirmed
both the exclusion of Dr. Papano's testi-
mony and summary disposition in favor of
Shaw.
THE PROBLEM
The Heller case reveals one of the cen-
tral problems underlying most mass and
toxic tort litigation-proving that the
defendant's product caused the plaintiff's
injury. As is the case with other torts, the
plaintiff in a mass or toxic tort case must
show duty, negligence, causation and dam-
age. In the mass or toxic tort context, how-
ever, the element of causation often plays a
dispositive role. Plaintiffs must prove both
that the product is capable of producing
the injuries (general causation) and that the
product actually did so (specific causa-
tion).2 To do so, they must rely on the tes-
timony of experts-toxicologists, engi-
neers, physicians-with scientific and
technical knowledge of the product in
question and its effects on the human
body. If the testimony of these experts is
either inadmissible or insufficient to carry
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the burden of proof, plaintiffs' cases can-
not go forward. Accordingly, the admissi-
bility and sufficiency of the expert testi-
mony often becomes a hotly contested
issue.
Inherent in ruling on the admissibility of
expert testimony is that courts must review
the underlying science to determine the re-
liability and relevance of the evidence. For
70 years, the "general acceptance" test
from Frye v. United States3 enjoyed almost
uniform application in both state and fed-
eral courts.4 This test admitted scientific
evidence if, and only if, it was generally
accepted in the pertinent scientific commu-
nity. Under Frye, courts looked deferen-
tially to scientists in determining whether
the proffered evidence met the standards of
scientific reliability.
This era of deference came to an end
with the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc.,5 which interpreted Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 as superseding the common
law "general acceptance" test. The Court
read Rule 702 as establishing a system
wherein federal trial judges ensure the reli-
ability, as well as the relevance, of scien-
tific testimony.
Trial judges must serve as "gatekeepers"
when it comes to scientific evidence, as-
sessing the methodologies underlying the
testimony of expert witnesses. Trial judges
must review and screen evidence based on
everything from aerodynamics to epidemi-
ology. The "gatekeeper" role was reaf-
firmed in General Electric Co. v. Joiner6
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.7
3. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. See CHRISTOPER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 7.8, at 744 (1995).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
7. 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999), rev'g 131 F.3d 1433
(11th Cir. 1997). For district court decision, see
Carmichael v. Samyang Tires Inc., 923 F.Supp.
1514 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
8. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 389 (5th
ed. 1982).
9. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35
F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing differen-
A source of scientific evidence in mass
and toxic tort litigation is the medical tech-
nique called differential diagnosis. It is a
clinical procedure whereby medical doc-
tors determine which of several potential
diseases is causing the patient's symptoms
by ruling out possible causes until only
one or two remain.'
Several courts have recognized the sig-
nificance of this procedure to the causation
issue.9 The problem thus turns on the reli-
ability and fit of using the technique to de-
termine cause in the legal, rather than the
clinical, sense. Although the cases have
fleshed out many of the questions concern-
ing the use of differential diagnosis as evi-
dence of causation, the answers to these
questions remain somewhat vague because
courts often confuse general and specific
causation, as well as admissibility and suf-
ficiency. A clear treatment of the issue is
needed.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS
Differential diagnosis, as used in the
medical profession, is a clinical process
whereby doctors determine from what dis-
ease a patient suffers. By comparing the
patient's symptoms to symptoms associ-
ated with known diseases, the physician at-
tempts to identify the disease or diseases
that best explain the facts of the patient's
case. 0 Identification takes place through a
process of elimination, 1 with the physician
collecting data on the patient's history and
illness, analyzing that data and ruling out
various diseases until a final diagnosis is
reached. In short, differential diagnosis is
tial diagnosis as technique that involves assessing
causation with respect to particular individual);
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 771 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (acknowledging importance of differen-
tial diagnosis to question of specific causation),
aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.
1996).
10. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F.Supp.
12, 21 n.41 (D. Mass. 1995). See also A. MCGEHEE
HARVEY & JAMES BORDLEY II1, DIFFERENTIAL DI-
AGNOSIS 7 (2d ed. 1970).
11. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp.2d
1217, 1229 (D. Colo. 1998).
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the act of distinguishing one disease from
another to select a proper treatment. 2
It thus aids a physician in determining
the injury from which a person suffers, but
the technique also is presented as evidence
of causation at trial. This has drawn criti-
cism from courts and commentators
alike. 3 This criticism often is justified be-
cause, while physicians speak in terms of
"cause," they generally focus their differ-
ential diagnosis on defining the patient's
illness. '4
On the other hand, a thorough diagnosis
frequently considers the underlying causal
agents of a disease in prescribing a treat-
ment. 5 Indeed, some courts describe the
technique of differential diagnosis as "dif-
ferential etiology," a term that heavily
stresses the causation issue since etiology
is the science and study of the causes of
disease. 16
When physicians seek to determine the
disease causing the symptoms-for ex-
ample, lung cancer-they often look for
and rule out known etiologic agents of the
disease-for example, asbestos. The most
likely agent remaining after this sifting is
considered the cause of the disease. If no
known etiologic agents remain on the list,
attention is focused on any suspicious sub-
12. See Stuart F. Spicker, Ethics in Diagnosis:
Bodily Integrity, Truth-telling, and the Good Physi-
cian, in THE ETHICS OF DIAGNOSIS 107, 108 (Jos6
Luis Peset & Diego Garcia eds., 1992) (identifying
treatment as final step in process of clinical reason-
ing).
13. See, e.g., Lofgren v. Motorola, 1998 WL
299915, at *24 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 1, 1998)
(finding, under Frye standard, that differential diag-
nosis is "unequivocally rejected by the scientific
community" as means of determining causation);
Bruce R. Parker, Understanding Epidemiology and
Its Use in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, 65
DEF. COUNS. J. 35, 57 (1998) (stating that differen-
tial diagnosis does not generally require doctor to
form conclusions regarding causal agents).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SELLER, DIFFERENTIAL
DIAGNOSIS OF COMMON COMPLAINTS 294-97 (3d
ed. 1996) (listing "causes" of shortness of breath as,
inter alia, asthma, emphysema, chronic bronchitis,
and congestive heart failure).
15. MYRON R. SCHOENFELD, STRICTLY CONFI-
DENTIAL: How DOCTORS MAKE DECISIONS 65
(1990).
stances, such as chemical compounds, to
which the patient has been exposed. For
treatment purposes, one or more of these
substances is presumed to be the cause of
the patient's disease. 7
Therefore, differential diagnosis often
consists of a clinical determination, by
process of elimination, of both the disease
causing the patient's symptoms and the
most likely etiologic agent causing that
disease. The problem arises from extrapo-
lating from this determination of clinical
causation, for treatment purposes, to cau-
sation in the legal sense.
Because physicians utilize differential
diagnosis in a clinical setting, some law-
yers contend that it does not constitute sci-
ence. 8 Medical writers, however, indicate
the contrary, noting that a physician should
perform a differential diagnosis in the
same manner as other scientific research-
objectively collecting all the facts, analyz-
ing them in an unprejudiced fashion and
ending with a logical conclusion. 19
Certainly, the steps in conducting a
proper differential diagnosis resemble the
scientific method, and differential diagno-
sis remains scientific in nature although
performed in a clinical environment. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in
16. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61
F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995).
17. Not all physicians agree on the soundness of
presuming causation. See, e.g., Barrow v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., 1998 WL 812318 at *23 n.221
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998) ("Dr. Kotzin was critical
of those who contend that silicone gel breast im-
plants are a cause of symptoms because they cannot
explain such symptoms using differential diagno-
sis.").
18. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12,
Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th
Cir. 1998) (en banc), filed in the U.S. Supreme
Court January 5, 1999 (No. 98-992) (arguing that
Daubert should not apply to clinical medical causa-
tion testimony because it is based on technical skill
and experience rather than scientific knowledge).
The Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire (foot-
note 7) may have rendered this argument moot be-
cause the Court held that Daubert's gatekeeper ob-
ligation applies not only to expert testimony based
on science, but to all expert testimony.
19. HARVEY & BORDLEY, supra note 10, at 3.
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Daubert applies to its use as causation evi-
dence in federal trials.
DAUBERT AND JOINER
A. Daubert
Daubert is the seminal case regarding
the admissibility of scientific expert testi-
mony. The new system it instituted for
testing the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence has resulted in confusion among
commentators and the lower courts.2°
The Court held that Rule 702 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence supersedes the
common law Frye test of general accep-
tance in the relevant scientific field. The
Court first noted that the Federal Rules
render a broad range of evidence admis-
sible and that neither Rule 702 nor its leg-
islative history mentions "general accep-
tance." The Court concluded that Congress
did not intend the "general acceptance"
standard to be applied as the sole test of
admissibility.
Having determined that Frye no longer
applied to litigation in the federal system,
the Court declared that Rule 702 estab-
lishes a "gatekeeping" role for the federal
trial courts, obligating the judge to "ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence is not only relevant, but reliable."
As to reliability, the Court noted that
Rule 702 required that an expert's testi-
mony be "scientific knowledge," a term
that implies a grounding in the procedures
of science. "Knowledge" implies that the
proposition must constitute more than sub-
jective belief or unsupported speculation.
Together, the two terms mean that experts
must derive their assertions by means of
the scientific method.
As to relevancy, the Court also looked
to the language of Rule 702, noting that
20. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32
GA. L. REV. 699, 701 (1998). For a concise
overview of the history of Daubert and a broad
discussion of its application in toxic tort cases, see
Christopher H. Buckley Jr. & Charles H. Haake,
Separating the Scientists Wheat from the
Charlatan's Chaff: Daubert's Role in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,293 (1998).
the rule requires that the scientific evi-
dence assist the trier of fact. To be admis-
sible, the evidence must "fit" the factual
dispute. "Fit" is not always obvious, the
Court explained, as scientific validity for
one purpose does not necessarily constitute
scientific validity for another. But there
must be a scientific connection between
the testimony and the pertinent inquiry.
To help the trial courts determine
whether evidence constitutes scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact,
the Court articulated the following non-
exhaustive list of factors: (1) whether the
theory or technique can be and has been
tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to
peer review and publication; (3) the known
or potential rate of error, (4) the existence
and maintenance of control standards; and
(5) whether the theory or technique enjoys
general acceptance in the relevant scien-
tific community. The Court specifically
admonished trial judges to focus on ex-
perts' methodologies, not their conclu-
sions, when applying these factors.
The Court further reminded the trial
judges that they must consider a host of
other evidentiary rules-for example, Rule
403, which permits the exclusion of rel-
evant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the "danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or
misleading of the jury, or by consider-
ations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." The Court also commented on the
strength of the adversary system, noting
that cross-examination and the introduc-
tion of contrary evidence are powerful
tools to combat shaky evidence. Trial
judges remain free, the Court advised, to
grant summary disposition if the evidence
is insufficient to support a jury verdict up-
holding the proffered position.
Finally, the Court conceded that impor-
tant differences exist between the search
for truth in the laboratory and the search
for truth in the courtroom. The former in-
volves a perpetual revision where wrong or
incomplete answers prove useful to the
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quest for an ultimate truth, while the latter
involves reaching a quick, final solution
about a given set of facts. Because of these
differences, the Court admitted that judges
inevitably will prevent the jury from hear-
ing about certain innovations that may turn
out to be correct. That event, however, is
the balance struck by the rules, which are
"designed not for the exhaustive search for
cosmic understanding but for the particu-
larized resolution of legal disputes."
B. Joiner
Four and a half years after Daubert, the
Court reaffirmed trial judges' gatekeeper
functions in Joiner. The primary issue in
that case was what standard appellate
courts should apply when reviewing dis-
trict court determinations of admissibility.
The llth Circuit, applying what was de-
scribed as a "particularly stringent stan-
dard of review," reversed the trial court's
decision to exclude the plaintiff's scientific
evidence and grant summary judgment to
the defendant. The Supreme Court in turn
reversed, holding that abuse of discretion
constituted the appropriate standard of re-
view.
Applying that standard, the Court con-
cluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, but rather was within its discre-
tion in excluding the plaintiffs scientific
expert testimony because the animal and
epidemiological studies on which that tes-
timony was based did not reliably support
the conclusions drawn. Conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from
one another, the Court stated, continuing:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence which is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and the opinion proffered.2"
C. Putting It All Together
The Court's decision in Daubert ush-
ered in a new regime under which the fed-
eral courts analyze the admissibility of sci-
entific expert testimony. The decision it-
self has raised a myriad of questions con-
cerning the proper performance of the
gatekeeping role, and the Court's subse-
quent decisions and opinions in Joiner and
Kuhmo Tire only scratch the surface in an-
swering those questions. In large part, the
Court seems to have remained purpose-
fully vague. Despite the confusion and am-
biguity, however, a general framework can
be drawn.
First, Daubert strengthens the trial
court's role in assessing scientific evi-
dence. Although Daubert enables district
courts to admit a somewhat broader range
of scientific testimony than was possible
under Frye, trial judges nonetheless pos-
sesses wide discretion to sift through ex-
perts' attestations. 22 They do not have to
defer to the scientific community when
making admissibility determinations. In-
stead, they play an active part in vigor-
ously ferreting out expert opinion not
based on relevant scientific methodology. 23
Second, trial judges are to analyze reli-
ability at every stage of the expert's deci-
sion-making process. The court must con-
sider not only whether each step of the
underlying methodology is reliable, but
also whether the conclusions drawn from
the methodology are reliable. If the meth-
odology is flawed at any step, then the tes-
timony does not meet the standard for ad-
missibility under Rule 702.24 "This is true
whether the step completely changes a reli-
able methodology or merely misapplies
that methodology. 25
21. 118 S.Ct. at 519.
22. See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d
381, 386 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing trial court's
strengthened role).
23. Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 774.
24. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947
F.Supp. 1387, 1401 (D. Or. 1996) (court performing
gatekeeping role must ensure faithful application of
scientific methodology "from initial premise to ulti-
mate conclusion" and not admit evidence based
only on "leap of faith").
25. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745.
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Third, the trial court must consider the
fit of both the scientific technique and the
conclusion drawn therefrom to the actual
issues in dispute in the case. The final con-
clusions formed by experts must connect
the science to the issues before the
factfinder. The exact standard for fit re-
mains somewhat elusive, but courts agree
that it is a higher standard than the general
relevancy requirement of Rule 402.26
Here the reliability and relevance analy-
ses overlap. If the underlying methodology
is not reliable, or if the conclusions do not
reliably flow from valid methodology, then
the testimony does not meet Daubert's fit
requirement. As the Court indicated in
Joiner, sometimes "there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered. '2 7 Therefore,
the standard for fit requires a sound con-
clusion, based on valid scientific proce-
dures, that clearly affects the resolution of
a contested issue. Consequently, the stan-
dard for fit looks more like an analysis of
sufficiency than admissibility.
Finally, trial judges must apply other
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, particularly Rule 403. Daubert
makes clear that the requirements for ad-
missibility under Rule 702 do not foreclose
the applicability of other rules, particularly
Rule 403.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS AND
ADMISSIBILITY
Post-Daubert cases addressing the ad-
missibility of causation testimony based on
differential diagnosis have split into three
basic camps.
26. See Daubert on remand, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321
n.17 (9th Cir. 1995); Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745.
27. 118 S.Ct. at 519.
28. 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).
29. Pick v. Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 958 F.Supp.
1151, 1162-63 (E.D. La. 1997); Wilson v. Petro-
leum Wholesale Inc., 904 F.Supp. 1188, 1190 (D.
Colo. 1995).
A. Overview of the Cases
1. "Broad Admissibility" Approach
These decisions share the common char-
acteristic of allowing physicians to testify
as to both levels of causation based exclu-
sively on their use of differential diagno-
sis. In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., for
example, the Second Circuit affirmed the
admission of testimony that fumes from
glue caused the plaintiff's throat polyps,
even though the physician could point to
no medical literature identifying glue
fumes as a general causal agent of the in-
jury. 28 The doctor's opinion passed muster
under Daubert because it was based on
differential diagnosis, and the trial court
therefore did not abuse its discretion in ad-
mitting the testimony. Any faults with the
use of this technique as a methodology
went to weight, rather than admissibility.
Federal district courts in Louisiana and
Colorado also have allowed medical expert
testimony on the issue of general causation
derived solely from differential diagno-
sis. 2
9
Because differential diagnosis consti-
tutes the primary clinical tool by which
medical doctors determine the disease
from which a patient suffers, as well as the
possible etiologic agents of that disease,
the "broad admissibility" approach allows
it as evidence of either level of causation.
In short, "broad admissibility" requires
only that the physician employ in the
courtroom the same techniques used when
treating patients in the examination room.
2. "Middle Ground" Approach
These decisions often admit causation
evidence derived from differential diagno-
sis, but they require that the clinical proce-
dure be coupled with something more. In
Heller, for example, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that Dr. Papano's differential diag-
nosis evidence satisfied Daubert's reliabil-
ity prong, even though he relied on no
published studies linking the chemicals in
the carpeting to the type of respiratory
problems from which Heller suffered. The
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court affirmed the exclusion of the testi-
mony, however, because the temporal rela-
tionship used by the doctor did not support
a conclusion that the carpet caused the
plaintiffs illness. Heller's symptoms first
appeared several weeks after the installa-
tion of the carpet, and they continued after
the carpet was removed.
As Heller demonstrates, the "middle
ground" cases allow differential diagnosis
evidence as long as the physician also re-
lies on some fact or circumstance indica-
tive of general causation. This additional
proof usually takes the form of a close
temporal relationship between the plain-
tiff's exposure to a supposedly toxic sub-
stance and the onset of illness or injuries.30
Alternately, this proof might consist of
generalized allegations, derived from anec-
dotal evidence but unsupported by any sci-
entific study, that the scientific community
possesses wide knowledge of the pre-
sumed causal agent's harmful effects.31
In either situation, the court apparently
views this additional proof as bolstering
the doctor's clinical determination that ex-
posure to the suspected product resulted in
the plaintiff's illness. Such evidence pre-
sumably allows the doctor to include the
product in the list of possible etiologic
agents. Put differently, a close temporal
link between exposure and symptom, or an
unsupported but widely circulated belief,
provides a reliable basis for the assumption
that the product is capable of causing the
disease in question. Without such evi-
dence, no reliable basis exists, and the
opinion must be excluded.
Under the "middle ground" approach,
30. See, e.g., Zuchowicz, 140 F.2d at 385 (ex-
plaining that expert reached conclusion on causa-
tion after considering temporal relationship and
conducting differential etiology).
31. See, e.g.. Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l Inc.,
128 F.3d 802, 809 (3d Cir. 1997) (as amended)
(finding that "widely accepted scientific knowledge
of the harmful nature of organophosphates" bol-
stered expert's conclusion). In the original opinion
in Kannankeril, the court declared: "It is an ac-
knowledged scientific fact that chlorpyrifos, the ac-
tive ingredient in Dursban, is harmful to humans
therefore, medical experts bear some bur-
den to show why they considered the
defendant's product to be a potential cause
in the first place. Some cases suggest a dif-
ferent presumption, however, viewing dif-
ferential diagnosis as inherently reliable
unless the defendants offer plausible alter-
native causes of the illness and the experts
fail to explain why their conclusions re-
main valid.32
3. "Narrow Admissibility"
Approach
The third group of decisions, like the
second, requires the expert to "rule in" the
defendant's product. The "narrow admissi-
bility" approach, however, does not con-
sider reliance on temporality or anecdotal
evidence to be a valid method of doing so.
Rather, these cases demand "hard science"
on the issue of general causation, such as
published and peer-reviewed scientific
studies establishing a statistically signifi-
cant link between the substance and the
disease.
The Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in
Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc. provides
a good example. 33 The court affirmed the
district judge's exclusion of medical testi-
mony based on differential diagnosis, a
temporal relationship and the manu-
facturer's material safety data sheet con-
taining generalized statements about the
potentially harmful effects of its chemical.
Although the majority referred only to the
physician's "examination and test results,"
the dissent makes clear that the doctor per-
formed a differential diagnosis. The doctor
and can cause the very symptoms displayed by Dr.
Kannankeril." No. 96-5818, slip op. at 12 n.8 (3d
Cir. Oct. 17, 1997). The court cited no authority for
its proposition. In the amended version, the court
deleted this sentence and referred to a letter written
by one of the experts summarizing various reports
on organophoshates generally, but none on chlor-
pyrifos specifically.
32. Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 808. This presump-
tion seems unjustifiably to shift the burden of proof
to the defendant.
33. 151 F. 3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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could not point to any reliable studies con-
necting the chemical to the plaintiff's in-
jury at the relevant exposure level, how-
ever, and this lack of tested and peer-
reviewed literature constituted the fatal
flaw in his opinion.
B. Application of the Daubert
Framework
Experts can attempt to explain three dis-
tinct aspects of causation by providing dif-
ferential diagnosis evidence (1) that the
defendant's product is capable of causing
the disease from which the plaintiff suf-
fers, (2) that the product indeed caused
that disease in this plaintiff, and (3) that
other agents did not cause the plaintiff's
disease. The first aspect obviously impli-
cates the element of general causation,
while the second and third concern specific
causation. Because each of these aspects
affects a different element of the causation
issue, the admissibility of differential diag-
nosis testimony as to each element de-
serves separate treatment.
1. General Causation
Testimony based on differential diagno-
sis is never admissible with regard to
34. Breast Implant, 11 F.Supp.2d at 1230.
35. Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 771.
36. Patricia E. Lin, Note, Opening the Gates to
Scientific Evidence in Toxic Exposure Cases: Medi-
cal Monitoring and Daubert, 17 REV. LITIG. 551,
575-80 (1998).
37. See Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 771 (although
physician was not toxicologist, he nonetheless must
apply principles and methods of toxicology to give
opinion on issue relating to that specialty).
38. See, e.g., Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1998) (testi-
mony reliable where physician not only performed
differential diagnosis but referred to scientific stud-
ies supporting his theory); Glaser v. Thompson
Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969, 975-78 (6th Cir. 1994)
(doctor had conducted differential diagnosis and
authored published studies relating to general cau-
sation); Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F.Supp.
49, 55-57 (D. D.C. 1997) (admitting testimony
where doctors employed differential diagnosis and
consulted studies showing causal link between
chemical and closely related disease).
whether a certain substance can generally
cause the disease in question because it
fails to satisfy both the reliability and rel-
evance requirements of Daubert.3 4 Taking
relevance first, differential diagnosis at
best addresses only the issue of specific
causation.35 It does not seek to establish
causal links between the remaining sub-
stances and the disease in the general
population, and it therefore does not fit the
general causation issue.
For this same reason, differential diag-
nosis does not satisfy Daubert's reliability
requirement. Differential diagnosis pre-
sumes, but does not itself establish, that
the substance in question is capable of pro-
ducing the harmful effects. Presumption
and supposition simply do not satisfy the
rigors of the scientific method. Differential
diagnosis does not, of itself, "rule in" any
causal agent.
It fails, moreover, to satisfy the Daubert
factors in the general causation context: (1)
it has not been peer reviewed as a method
of establishing general causation; (2) no
publications exist describing it as such;
and (3) epidemiologists and toxicologists,
those scientists who study the causes of
disease, do not employ it as a methodology
of their disciplines. 6
This is not to say that physicians may
never testify on the issue of general causa-
tion. To do so, however, they must have
done something more than rule out other
potential causes. Rather, they must explain
how they were able to "rule in" the product
in question. Put differently, they must
point to some reliable evidence on general
causation, employing the principles and
methods of epidemiologists or toxicolo-
gists, before giving an opinion relating to
those fields.37 Having consulted scientific
studies with the qualifications necessary to
explain the methodologies used and ex-
trapolated the data to the instant case, phy-
sician experts may testify that the product
can cause the disease.38
Physicians must consult and rely on
"hard science" before offering opinions on
general causation. Because the "broad ad-
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missibility" approach allows a physician's
general causation testimony based solely
on differential diagnosis, that approach
does not faithfully apply the Daubert
framework. Instead of requiring scientifi-
cally valid methodologies relating to gen-
eral causation-such as dose-response and
epidemiological and toxicological stud-
ies-"broad admissibility" permits experts
to opine based on assumption, thereby ig-
noring the purpose of Daubert's gate-
keeping obligation.
The justification for the "broad admissi-
bility" approach is the wide use of differ-
ential diagnosis in clinical medicine. The
response is found in Daubert, which ac-
knowledges the "important differences be-
tween the quest for truth in the courtroom
and the quest for truth in the laboratory."39
In medicine, physicians assume the most
likely causal agent of their patients' ill-
nesses so as to prescribe treatment and re-
lieve suffering. As the maxim goes, medi-
cine is not an exact science; it often
proceeds by trial and error.
Law is not an exact science either, but it
has developed certain rules to help en-
sure that allegedly wronged persons re-
ceive compensation only from those who
wronged them. One of the oldest of these
rules is the requirement that the defen-
dant's conduct actually caused the harm.
Courts primarily need expert evidence
demonstrating that the product is capable
of causing the harm. Courts should not ex-
pect more from experts than the level of
intellectual rigor found in the relevant
field. For purposes of general causation,
the relevant field is epidemiology or toxi-
cology, not clinical medicine. Clinical
techniques like differential diagnosis do
not bear on general causation and are inad-
missible as to that issue.
Similarly, to the extent it permits testi-
mony on the issue of general causation, the
"middle ground" approach fails to apply
the Daubert framework faithfully. Permit-
ting physician experts to "rule in" the
defendant's product based on nothing
more than a close temporal relationship
and generalized allegations proves no
more valid than allowing them simply to
assume the product can cause the disease.
The conclusion still rests on conjecture.
Temporality and case studies may give rise
to a hypothesis regarding general causa-
tion, but they certainly do not provide
proof in support of that hypothesis.
The "narrow admissibility" approach,
which requires the physician expert to con-
sult and extrapolate from scientific studies,
comes closest to the correct Daubert
analysis of this question.
2. Specific Causation
In contrast to its use as proof of general
causation, differential diagnosis is ordi-
narily admissible with regard to both as-
pects of specific causation. Concerning
what did not cause the plaintiff's injury,
differential diagnosis is both reliable and
relevant. After all, physicians use the tech-
nique as a way of ruling out potential
causes of symptoms. Differential diagnosis
also satisfies many of the Daubert factors
when used for this purpose: (1) it has been
peer reviewed and tested; (2) books have
been published explaining the process; and
(3) it enjoys general acceptance in the
medical community.
Finally, when proffered to rule out alter-
native causes, differential diagnosis fits a
disputed issue in the case. Plaintiffs must
be able to eliminate, or at least minimize,
the chance that other etiologic agents con-
tributed to the injury in order to prove that
the defendant's product more likely than
not caused the disease.4"
Even though differential diagnosis satis-
fies Daubert when utilized to eliminate al-
ternative causes, courts should scrutinize
physicians' testimony carefully for the po-
tential to mislead and confuse. A jury can
easily misinterpret evidence regarding
39. 509 U.S. at 596-97 (1993). See also Breast
Implant, 11 F.Supp.2d at 1230 (recognizing distinc-
tion between causation in clinical sense and causa-
tion in legal sense).
40. Cavallo, 892 F.Supp. at 771.
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what did not cause an injury as evidence of
what did, especially when it comes from a
well-credentialed medical doctor. Courts
must satisfy themselves that juries under-
stand the purpose for which such evidence
is proffered, and judges should consider
the appropriateness of limiting instructions
under Rule 105. If, however, the testimony
has such great potential to misdirect and
confuse that it cannot be cured by careful
instruction, it must be excluded under Rule
403.
In addition to its admissibility as to what
did not cause an injury, physicians' expert
testimony based on differential diagnosis
is admissible with regard to what did cause
such injury. Again, when used for this pur-
pose, the process meets both the reliability
and relevance requirements of Daubert. A
medical opinion as to a plaintiff's disease
and its underlying etiology has relevance
to the question of liability. While plaintiffs
can produce hundreds of epidemiological
studies showing a statistically significant
correlation between the product and the
disease, they must also prove that the prod-
uct caused the disease in the instant case.
Medical testimony is the best way to
meet this burden. Moreover, a specific
causation opinion based on differential di-
agnosis fits the data collected-histories,
examinations and observations relating to
the illness of one particular individual.
To show that differential diagnosis is re-
liable when tendered for this purpose
proves a bit trickier, primarily because of
the ease with which admissibility can be
confused with sufficiency. Looking at
Kumho Tire again, it becomes clear that
judges should hold a witness only to those
standards that typify the practice of the rel-
evant field. For purposes of general causa-
tion, the relevant field is epidemiology or
toxicology. For purposes of specific causa-
41. See, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Asso-
ciated Milk Producers Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 942, 963-
67 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Breast Implant, 11 F.Supp.2d
at 1229-30; Hall, 947 F.Supp. at 1413; Cavallo, 892
F.Supp. at 771-72.
42. Joiner, 118 S.Ct. at 519.
tion, however, the focus shifts to clinical
medicine because physicians, not toxicolo-
gists, treat individual patients. As part of
that treatment, the physician to some ex-
tent must determine what is causing the
patient's illness.
Here, differential diagnosis becomes re-
liable since it constitutes the standard diag-
nostic procedure by which physicians de-
termine the appropriate disease and its
most likely underlying causes. For pur-
poses of explaining the cause of an indi-
vidual plaintiff's injury to a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty, differential
diagnosis remains valid science. Accord-
ingly, it should be admissible for this pur-
pose even when the physician fails to con-
sult scientific studies that "rule in" the
defendant's product
The "narrow admissibility" approach
consequently seems to run afoul of Dau-
bert in this regard by demanding that the
expert consult "hard science" before offer-
ing a causation opinion. The decisions
grouped in this category repeatedly refer to
the necessity of ruling in the suspected
cause and justifiably reject differential
diagnosis for this purpose.4' The courts'
uneasiness with clinical evidence, unsup-
ported by "hard science," is understand-
able, especially in light of Joiner's sugges-
tion that gatekeeping involves winnowing
out those opinions that require too great an
analytical leap.42 As a result, these deci-
sions exclude the physician's testimony as
unreliable.
Underlying the exclusions of physician
testimony in the "narrow admissibility"
cases, however, is the plaintiffs' complete
failure to provide any reliable expert testi-
mony concerning general causation. In
Cavallo, for example, the plaintiff at-
tempted to proffer the opinion of a toxi-
cologist as well as her physician. The court
first excluded the toxicologist's testimony
on the issue of general causation because,
to the extent his theory had been tested in
the scientific literature, it failed. Hence,
the testimony was neither scientifically
valid nor admissible under Daubert. Only
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after excluding this general causation evi-
dence did the court fault the physician's
testimony as incapable of ruling in the
defendant's product.
Had the toxicologist produced reliable
general causation evidence, however, the
court likely would have allowed the doctor
to testify. The court's decision to exclude
the differential diagnosis testimony, as
well as its subsequent decision to grant the
defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, had more to do with the sufficiency
of that testimony to carry the plaintiff's
case than with its admissibility.4 3
In the end, differential diagnosis evi-
dence is admissible under Daubert when
offered to establish specific causation, but
a plaintiff still may lose the case on sum-
mary judgment because differential diag-
nosis is not sufficient to meet the burden
of proof.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS AND
SUFFICIENCY
Although Daubert ostensibly dealt only
with the issue of admissibility, its fit re-
quirement, as explained in Joiner, raises
questions concerning its significance on
the issue of sufficiency. The standard for
fit requires a sound conclusion, based on
scientifically valid procedures, that clearly
and directly speaks to a disputed issue in
the case. If the methodologies used by the
expert are not reliable, or if the conclusion
does not adequately flow from those meth-
odologies, the court may exclude the testi-
mony. As Joiner explained: "A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered."' This statement, while
directly addressing the admissibility of sci-
43. 892 F.Supp. at 774-75.
44. 118 S.Ct at 519. Indeed, Joiner cited as au-
thority the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Turpin v.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992), a
case dealing with sufficiency rather than admissibil-
ity.
45. See generally Capra, supra note 19, at 751-
55 (discussing Daubert and the sufficiency inquiry).
entific evidence, in actuality appears to be
a standard for determining whether the evi-
dence is sufficient to meet the proffering
party's burden of proof.
The lower courts disagree as to whether
Daubert's gatekeeping obligation altered
the role judges play in determining suffi-
ciency.15 The Second Circuit, for example,
concluded in In re Joint Eastern and
Southern District Asbestos Litigation "that
Daubert did not alter the traditional suffi-
ciency standard. 46 Noting that admissibil-
ity and sufficiency "necessitate different
inquiries and involve different stakes," the
court held that the standard for sufficiency
mirrors the standard for determining judg-
ment as a matter of law. Thus, unlike the
probing inquiry that characterizes judges'
role as gatekeepers for purposes of admis-
sibility, the appropriate standard for as-
sessing sufficiency remains "whether a
reasonable trier of fact could find in favor
of the non-moving party. 4 7
The Sixth Circuit employed a different
approach in Conde v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp.,48 in which it affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant. Although the
plaintiffs contested the trial court's exclu-
sion of their expert witnesses' testimony,
the court stated that the real issue was the
trial court's alternative determination that
the expert testimony was insufficient to
prove causation. The court then engaged in
a Daubert-like analysis, finding various
flaws in their methodologies and noting
that the epidemiological studies on the
subject found little evidence linking the
supposed cause to the injury in question.
Accordingly, their conclusions did not reli-
ably flow from the data collected, and the
trial court was right in finding the evidence
insufficient on the issue of causation. 49
46. 52 F.3d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir. 1995).
47. Capra, supra note 19, at 752.
48. 24 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1994).
49. See also Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., v.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 713 (Tex. 1997) (apply-
ing Daubert factors to sufficiency inquiry and stat-
ing that U.S. Supreme Court would agree that deter-
mination of scientific reliability is appropriate in
reviewing legal sufficiency).
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The debate over Daubert's application
to the sufficiency inquiry is, according to
one commentator, "more apparent than
real ... because admissibility and suffi-
ciency often go hand in hand, especially in
toxic tort cases, where exclusion of an ex-
pert on admissibility grounds is usually
tantamount to a dismissal on insufficiency
grounds."5 That is certainly true of the
"narrow admissibility" decisions described
above, many of which excluded differen-
tial diagnosis evidence because the conclu-
sion that the defendant's product caused
the plaintiff's injury required too great an
analytical leap in the absence of reliable
general causation evidence. Put differently,
the evidence did not fit the data.
While Daubert clearly allows a court to
make this type of ruling under the rubric of
admissibility, the real issue in these situa-
tions is the plaintiff's ability to satisfy the
burden of production. Therefore, under ei-
ther the Second Circuit's traditional ap-
proach to sufficiency or the Sixth Circuit's
heightened analysis, differential diagnosis
is never sufficient to send the case to the
jury. Differential diagnosis has only lim-
ited admissibility; it can be used only to
establish specific causation.
Differential diagnosis never satisfies
Daubert so as to be admissible on the issue
of general causation. When plaintiffs can-
not offer any scientifically valid evidence
concerning a product's general ability to
cause the injury in question, they fail to
make out a prima facie case, and summary
judgment is warranted even if plaintiffs of-
fer admissible medical testimony concern-
ing specific causation.
Hence, the "narrow admissibility" deci-
sions confuse the issues, but they ulti-
mately reach the right result-summary
disposition based on a failure to produce
reliable proof that the product can cause
the disease.
50. Capra, supra note 19, at 754.
CONCLUSION
Daubert dramatically changed the sys-
tem for testing the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence. As a result, it changed the
way in which toxic and mass tort cases are
litigated. Because plaintiffs must have ex-
pert testimony concerning both general
and specific causation, the admissibility
and sufficiency of that testimony becomes
crucial. A decision that the expert testi-
mony does not meet the standards for reli-
ability or fit renders plaintiffs incapable of
proving all the elements of their claims.
Likewise, even when courts admit expert
testimony, plaintiffs lose if the evidence
does not suffice to prove that the defen-
dant's product more likely then not caused
the injuries.
One of the sources of expert testimony
frequently used to establish causation in
mass and toxic tort cases is the medical
process known as differential diagnosis.
Because this technique collects data relat-
ing to a particular patient, it is never ad-
missible under Daubert with regard to gen-
eral causation. Not only does differential
diagnosis, by focusing on individuals, not
fit the issue of general causation, it also
fails Daubert's reliability prong by assum-
ing, rather than proving, that the supposed
cause actually produces the disease in
question. Accordingly, courts that adhere
to the "broad admissibility" approach,
which allows expert medical testimony as
to either level of causation, do not faith-
fully fulfill their gatekeeping obligation.
The "middle ground" approach, which
permits a physician to "rule in" the sus-
pected product based on temporality or an-
ecdotal evidence, similarly falls short. Epi-
demiology and toxicology constitute the
relevant scientific fields when proving
general causation, and a medical doctor
must employ the methodologies of those
disciplines to opine on the general causa-
tion issue.
The "narrow admissibility" approach
comes closest to the appropriate analysis
under Daubert by demanding that the phy-
sician consult "hard science" in the form
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of tested studies. But this approach over-
looks the distinction between general and
specific causation. Because clinical medi-
cine constitutes the relevant field of study
as to the latter, testimony based on a prop-
erly performed differential diagnosis satis-
fies Daubert with regard to specific causa-
tion. The physician should be allowed to
give an opinion concerning what did cause
the illness as well as what did not.
Courts should examine such testimony
carefully under Rule 403, however, to
make sure that it does not mislead or con-
fuse the jury. In the end, though, differen-
tial diagnosis evidence generally remains
admissible on the issue of specific causa-
tion, and to the extent that it excludes dif-
ferential diagnosis in this context, the "nar-
row admissibility" approach reaches
further than it should.
Although Daubert seems to provide for
such a result by allowing the district courts
to conclude that the analytical gap between
the data and the ultimate opinion is simply
too great, the Supreme Court would have
done better to classify this as an assess-
ment of sufficiency rather than admissi-
bility. Indeed, the Court itself lifted that
standard from a lower court decision ad-
dressing sufficiency. Moreover, the appli-
cation of Daubert often leads to the exclu-
sion of evidence that should be admissible
when the two inquiries are theoretically
separated, but that requires the fact finder
to engage in too much speculation or con-
jecture. Differential diagnosis falls into
this description.
Courts should allow physician expert
testimony based on differential diagnosis
but unsupported by "hard science" when
proffered to establish specific causation.
But if plaintiffs cannot independently dem-
onstrate general causation by scientific
studies, then they fail to make out a prima
facie case, and summary judgment should
be granted to defendants.
Until the Supreme Court concedes that
Daubert affects sufficiency review, how-
ever, lower courts will likely continue to
confuse that inquiry with the assessment of
admissibility. Of course, that concession
necessarily implicates substantive tort
policy, an area governed by state law.
Such a concession therefore would involve
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,5 begging
the question whether Daubert remains
valid in light of that decision's federalism
concerns.
51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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